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I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This OAP examined and addressed security clearance-based delays for Twenty-Fifth Air Force (25 AF) airmen
at National Security Agency (NSA) sites and other locations with the organization’s mission systems. The
approximate personnel cost associated with this issue was $95.98M at the beginning of the OAP cycle. Across
the enterprise, 985 airmen were unable to perform their missions. Opportunities for improvement were sought
across all steps of the security clearance process.
Tracked data consisted of: 1) open National Background Investigation Bureau (OPM/NBIB) priority personnel
security investigations and DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility (DoD CAF) adjudications, 2) NSA Military
Affairs Division (MADO) security holds, and 3) counter-intelligence polygraph (ci-polygraph) requirements.
Using this institutional data, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 65-503 (US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors) was
utilized to apply costs to define the original state of affairs and determine the impact of improvements.
A sample list of actions taken includes: 1) Applications for intelligence-related personnel are now given a priority
label at military entrance processing stations, 2) four contract clearance screeners were added to the basic military
training workforce, 3) a personnel processing code requiring a current ci-polygraph in order to get movement
orders was added to certain assignments, 4) MADO authorized site-to-site transfers, 5) MADO agreed to accept
security information packages six months prior to arrival, and 6) a Clearance Workforce Verification System
contract was awarded to create a web-based solution to handle transfer paperwork. The impact of all actions
taken will not be seen until 2019 and beyond.
During the reporting period (January-October 2018), the total personnel unable to access NSA sites or systems
in our three categories dropped from 985 to 822—a 17 percent decrease. Commensurately, total personnel costs
decreased from $95,984,348 to $80,136,624, a net improvement of $15,847,724.
The total number of security investigations requiring OPM/NBIB closure and DoD CAF adjudication increased
from 446 to 550 personnel—a 23 percent rise. The personnel costs contained in this category rose from
$43,462,786 to $53,631,963—up $10,169,177. Although the category was a net negative for this period, I
maintain that without the actions taken this year that figure could be as much as 122 cases, or $11.9M, higher.
CI-polygraph numbers changed little over the reporting cycle. In January, 90 personnel were waiting, while in
October the total was 99. The costing data moved from $8,768,965 to $9,645,862—an increase of $876,897.
One unit’s tracking error late in the project eliminated what was projected to be a roughly $3M gain.
MADO holds improved the most. The number fell from 449 to 173—a 61 percent improvement. The associated
personnel costs dropped from $43,752,597 to $16,858,799, a $26,893,798 improvement. Holds greater than 30
days fell from 173 airmen at the beginning of the project to 93 at the conclusion—down by 46 percent. While
every hold matters, these longer-term ones are especially troubling to our wings.
Factors impacting data outcomes included: 1) field unit data reporting errors, 2) OPM/NBIB priority processing
slowed from 100 to 154 days, 3) DoD CAF adjudication time increased from 14 to 76 days, 4) average new cases
added outpaced those closed/adjudicated by 21 per month, and 5) the Air Force’s migration to a new security
information system, a system that NSA does not use yet.
This OAP project was not designed to overhaul the structure of the clearance process. It pursued operational
improvements to gain the most from the current system. Future researchers should focus on an approach akin
to the operational innovation described by Michael Hammer where an entirely new way of doing business alters
the security clearance process to achieve breakthrough change.
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II.

INTRODUCTION
This Organizational Action Project (OAP) explored the personnel costs to Twenty-Fifth

Air Force due to security clearance-based delays for airmen working at National Security
Agency sites or on its systems. This was, and remains, a serious mission readiness issue and
addressing it directly tied to supporting our commander’s posted priorities. While many
commentators focus on the security leaks that have periodically occurred at the National Security
Agency, few really scrutinize the unintended consequences of decisions made in the wake of the
furor generated by those events. This project attempted to help bridge that gap.
As will be demonstrated later, the personnel costs associated with this issue were
substantial, totaling over $95M annually at the beginning of the project. Though significant, and
on first glance potentially daunting, addressing security clearance-based delays is not
insurmountable. Steps taken this year eliminated over $15M of that cost. These actions will
bear fruit into the future. Of note, the effect of some initiatives detailed herein will not be seen
until 2019.
What follows is a description of the overall issue by reviewing those intelligence leaks,
examining the literature related to unintended consequences, and describing my organization, as
well as the security clearance process itself. Following that, Twenty-Fifth Air Force specific
data is examined to show the impact by dissecting the issue into its constituent parts, including
the investigation and review by the National Background Investigation Bureau and Department
of Defense Consolidated Adjudication Facility, the counter-intelligence polygraph requirement,
and the National Security Agency’s Military Affairs Division review. After that, the steps taken
to improve the situation throughout the year are explored. A variety of initiatives were enacted,
ranging from process and procedural changes to technical solutions and personnel actions.
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III.

REVIEW OF NSA INTELLIGENCE LEAKS
Security measures are intended to prevent the loss or transfer of classified material to

unauthorized parties. That being said, intelligence leaks, especially those concerning the
National Security Agency (NSA), persisted as major news items in recent years. The biggest of
these stemmed from the actions of Edward Snowden, a Booz Allen Hamilton contract employee
who worked as a computer system administrator. When Snowden began leaking parts of the
over 1.7 million documents he illegally removed on a thumb drive to the Washington Post and
Guardian newspapers in June 2013, the story became a dominate headline, resulting, for
example, in 988 entries in the Washington Post and 747 in the New York Times over the next six
months.1
Other NSA related incidents include Harold T. Martin III, Reality Winner, Thomas
Drake, and Katharine Gunn. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Martin, another
Booz Allen Hamilton contractor, in August of 2016 for taking terabytes of classified documents
from NSA, some purportedly related to hacking tools. An additional contractor, Reality Winner,
was arrested in June 2017 for removing classified information related to Russian attempts to
influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election and leaking it to a reporter. Moving further back in
time, Thomas Drake was indicted in 2010 for allegedly giving classified information to a
Baltimore Sun reporter in 2005, while Katharine Gun, a British citizen and Government
Communications Headquarters employee, leaked an NSA memo relating to the United Nations
to the Observer during the period prior to the Iraq War, causing diplomatic issues for the United

1

The full designation of NSA is the National Security Agency/Central Security Service. Glenn P. Hastedt, “The Press
as an Agent of Oversight: The NSA Leaks,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 29, no. 1
(November 2015): 26-27, 32; Michelle Van Cleave, “What It Takes: In Defense of the NSA,” World Affairs 176, no. 4
(November/December 2013): 57, 61; Bob Toxen, “The NSA and Snowden: Securing the All-Seeing Eye,”
Communications of the ACM 57, no. 5 (May 2014): 44.
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States. These only represent some incidents tied to NSA, not others like PFC Bradley Manning,
Shamai Lebowitz, Stephen Jin Woo Kim, and Jeffrey Sterling of the U.S. Army, FBI,
Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency respectively.2
The highlighted cases show that the insider threat is real and a legitimate area of concern
for intelligence organizations. Security procedures are necessary to protect the data that helps
protect American citizens and the country’s national security interests from adversaries. Leaks
have occurred and they create pressure on organizations to act since each occurrence damages
national security, diplomatic relations with allies, cooperation with foreign intelligence
organizations, and the intelligence community’s credibility with the public. This pressure has
generated a bias toward conservatism and caution in the intelligence community as it relates to
making decisions about the security clearance process.3
Nevertheless, military personnel as a category, the issue at hand for this OAP, does not
appear to really be an area in need of tightening. Other than the Manning case, incidents have
not been related to military personnel. Even with Manning, clearance processing was not the

2

Government Communications Headquarters is more commonly referred to as GCHQ and is the British equivalent
of the NSA. Michael V. Hayden, “Beyond Snowden: An NSA Reality Check,” World Affairs 176, no. 5
(January/February 2014): 13; Martin Bright, “Katharine Gun: Ten years on what happened to the woman who
revealed dirty tricks on the UN Iraq war vote?,” Guardian, March 2, 2013,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/03/katharine-gun-iraq-war-whistleblower; David Wise, “Leaks
and the Law: The Story of Thomas Drake,” Smithsonian Magazine, August 2011,
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/leaks-and-the-law-the-story-of-thomas-drake-14796786/; Josh
Gerstein, “Alleged leaker Reality Winner said she stuffed NSA report in her pantyhose,” Politico, September 27,
2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/27/reality-winner-nsa-document-pantyhose-243236; Tim
Shorrock, “Why Does Wikileaks keep publishing U.S. state secrets? Private contractors,” Washington Post, March
16, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/16/the-reason-wikileaks-receives-somany-u-s-state-secrets-private-contractors/?utm_term=.edd89798835c; Jack Detsch and Jeff Stone, “NSA arrest
highlights struggle to prevent insider threats,” Christian Science Monitor, October 7, 2016,
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2016/1007/NSA-arrest-highlights-struggle-to-prevent-insiderthreats.
3
Derek B. Johnson, “NBIB confirms 700,000 security clearance backlog,” FCW, September 6, 2017,
https://fcw.com/articles/2017/09/06/nbib-phelan-clearance-backlog.aspx; Deb Riechmann, “Security Clearance
Points to Problems with Access to Secrets,” Military.com, September 12, 2017, https://www.military.com/dailynews/2017/09/12/security-clearance-points-problems-access-secrets.html.
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area that would have prevented his act. As Bob Toxen described in his article, “The NSA and
Snowden: Securing the All-Seeing Eye,” there were a number of technical solutions capable of
thwarting Edward Snowden, but I also argue they would have stopped Manning as well.4 As a
result, the project worked toward unraveling some unnecessary impediments that have evolved
over the years. Some of which may have arisen as a result of that pressure to act. Essentially,
while intelligence leaks have certainly occurred at the hands of individual actors, the wellintended security decisions designed to protect the nation’s secrets led to negative unintended
consequences for mission accomplishment. For context, this report will now briefly discuss the
nature of unintended consequences.
IV.

DECISIONS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

a. Nature of Decision-Making
Anyone that has occupied a leadership position can attest to the notion that decisionmaking is an inexact process made with imperfect information. There are constraints which
impact the decision maker’s ability to reach the best choice. As highlighted by Herbert Simon,
“complex circumstances, limited time, and inadequate mental computational power reduce
decisions makers to a state of ‘bounded rationality.’”5 Additionally, Diana Young, Adam
Goodie, Daniel Hall, and Eric Wu underscore that “the goal of any decision maker is to make the
most optimal decisions possible with a minimal amount of cognitive strain or effort.”6 In this
pursuit decision makers utilize coping strategies that Young, et al., characterize as
noncompensatory (information filtration, acceleration) and compensatory (more holistic
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Toxen, “The NSA and Snowden,” 44, 46-49; Detsch and Stone, “NSA arrest highlights struggle to prevent insider
threats”; Shorrock, “Why Does Wikileaks keep publishing U.S. state secrets? Private contractors.”
5
Leigh Buchanan and Andrew O’Connell, “A Brief History of Decision Making,” Harvard Business Review, January
2006, https://hbr.org/2006/01/a-brief-history-of-decision-making.
6
Diana Young, Adam Goodie, Daniel Hall, and Eric Wu, “Decision making under time pressure, modeled in a
prospect theory framework,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 118, no 2 (July 2012): 179.
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evaluation of options), while the addition of time pressure results in “speed-accuracy tradeoffs,”
resulting in inferior outcomes. Time pressure further affects risk aversion with consequent
decreases in willingness to pursue a course of action perceived as risky as time pressure
increases, something likely pertinent to the subject under consideration in this report.7
Given the complexity of the decision-making process and the effects pressure induces, it
is unsurprising that Andrew Cortell and Susan Peterson state that institutions tend to be “sticky”
and that “they are characterized by long periods of stasis and change only in response to
significant crises or critical junctures.”8 In addition, they discuss the nature of path dependency
in these cases, showing how policy responses to new stimuli are built on the foundation of
previous institutional actions and structures. Denis Smith and Dominic Elliott, however, using
the case of Hurricane Rita in 2005, demonstrate how decision responses to significant crises
themselves generate unintended consequences.9 Whether inside or outside a crisis context,
holding with Lucia Helena Martins da Silva and Karina De Dea Roglio, one sees that “from the
moment a decision maker takes a decision and the resulting action is implemented, such decision
produces consequences beyond those intended.”10
b. Unintended Consequences Definitions
Various authors define the concept of unintended consequences in their work. Cortell
and Peterson defined it as “those policy, procedural, and/or institutional consequences that
diverge from the goals sought by the agents who originally established or altered the

7

Ibid., 179-180, 187.
Andrew Cortell and Susan Peterson, “Limiting the Unintended Consequences of Institutional Change,”
Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 7 (September 2001): 774.
9
Ibid.; Denis Smith and Dominic Elliott, “Exploring the Barriers to Learning from Crisis,” Management Learning 38,
no. 5 (2007): 526; Lucia Helena Martins Da Silva and Karina De Dea Roglio, “Enhancing the Strategic DecisionMaking Process: Unintended Consequences as a Source of Learning," Latin American Business Review 16, no. 1
(2015): 5.
10
Ibid.
8
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institution.”11 Patrick Baert stated, “I refer to a particular effect of purposive action which is
different from what was wanted at the moment of carrying out the act, and the want of which
was a reason for carrying it out.”12 Guowei Jian claimed the phrase “refers to the consequences
that would not have taken place if a social actor had acted differently but that are not what the
actor had intended to happen.”13 For Da Silva and Roglio, an “unintended consequence means a
surprise that happens in one of two ways: (1) the consequence was not anticipated in the phase
of analyzing possible courses of action in the decision-making process; (2) there were
unpredicted changes during the implementation.”14
A number of authors are more succinct in their phraseology. For example, Rodger Dean
Duncan specified, “In politics and business, ‘unintended consequences’ is the handy term for
outcomes that are not the ones foreseen by a purposeful act.”15 Some, particularly complexity
theorists, even speak of a law of unintended consequences, highlighting a belief in the
inescapability and unpredictability of these outcomes (“second-order effects”) and encouraging
caution to decision makers as a result.16 On the other hand, while agreeing that accurate
predictability remained a bridge too far, Perri 6 (aka David Ashworth) argued that patterns do in
fact exist and that unintended consequences are not random events.17
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Cortell and Peterson, “Limiting the Unintended Consequences of Institutional Change,” 771.
Patrick Baert, “Unintended Consequences: A Typology and Examples,” International Sociology 6, no. 2 (June
1991): 201.
13
Guowei Jian, “Unpacking Unintended Consequences in Planned Organizational Change: A Process Model,”
Management Communications Quarterly 21, no. 1 (August 2007): 6.
14
Da Silva and Roglio, “Enhancing the Strategic Decision-Making Process: Unintended Consequences as a Source of
Learning," 6.
15
Rodger Dean Duncan, “Unintended consequences: Minimizing the ‘Oops Factor’ in Decision Making,” Forbes,
June 22, 2015, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rodgerdeanduncan/2015/06/22/unintended-consequencesminimizing-the-oops-factor-in-decision-making/#33722c49671b.
16
David W. Stowe and Craig A. Jeffrey, “Risk Management in Isolation is Risky,” Financial Executive, March 2008,
26; Perri 6 (aka David Ashworth), "Explaining Unintended and Unexpected Consequences of Policy Decisions:
Comparing Three British Governments, 1959-74," Public Administration 92, no. 3 (2014): 673.
17
Ibid., 689.
12
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c. Robert Merton’s Characterization
For a characterization of the phenomenon, this report turns to the modern progenitor of
unintended consequences literature, Robert Merton. Merton, who approached this issue from a
societal or institutional level in his influential 1936 article, identified five limitations to
accurately predicting the consequences of actions taken: 1) ignorance, 2) error, 3) immediacy of
actor interest, 4) basic values, and 5) public predictions of future developments. Ignorance
entails the current state of knowledge and the necessity of taking action even in the face of
incomplete information. Error involves simply making an incorrect decision for the situation at
hand or a flaw in executing the chosen course of action. Whether stemming from an incorrect or
incomplete understanding of the circumstances or not, this results in an unintended outcome.
The immediacy of actor interest results in short-term focused decision-making at the expense of
a long-term orientation. For Merton, Adam Smith’s theory of the “invisible hand” of economics
belongs in this category. Basic values require actions without analyzing and examining the full
range of options because certain actions are essentially required due to that belief system. Duty
becomes the measure of merit over selecting the most optimum option. Merton placed Max
Weber’s description of the Protestant work ethic and capitalism under this heading. Finally,
Merton held that public predictions of future developments essentially corrupted the experiment,
if you will, leading to almost self-fulfilling prophecies. The prediction itself became a new
component in the equation that drove the scenario toward unintended consequences.18 “Thus, to

18

Robert K. Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” American Sociological Review
1, no. 6 (December 1936): 900-904; Jian, “Unpacking Unintended Consequences in Planned Organizational Change:
A Process Model,” 6; George Engelhard, Jr. and Stefanie A. Wind, “Educational Testing and Schooling:
Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research and
Perspectives 11, no. 1-2 (2013): 33; Perri 6, "Explaining Unintended and Unexpected Consequences of Policy
Decisions: Comparing Three British Governments, 1959-74," 675; Pavlin Mavrodiev, “Decisions and Their
Unintended Consequences,” (PhD thesis, ETH Zurich [Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich], 2014), 3-4,
https://www.sg.ethz.ch/media/medialibrary/2014/11/Mavrodiev_Pavlin_ETH_22026.pdf.
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the extent that the predictions…are made public and action proceeds with full cognizance of
these predictions, the ‘other-things-being-equal’ condition tacitly assumed in all forecasting is
not fulfilled.”19
d. Nature of Unintended Consequences
At this point it is pertinent to address that all unintended consequences are not negative.
In reality, they can be positive, negative, or neutral in nature. They may support the original goal
of decision makers, undermine that goal, or have no effect on it whatsoever. Unintended
consequences may occur close to the decision or not emerge until a later period. This time
component complicates the assessment of pinpointing the correct nature of cause and effect. The
greater the time lapse, the greater the difficulty in attributing connections.20 Merton limits his
approach to imputation of cause and effect to “those elements in the resulting situation which are
exclusively the outcome of the action, i.e. those elements which would not have occurred had the
action not taken place…These sum-total or concrete consequences may be differentiated into (a)
consequences to the actor(s), (b) consequences to other persons mediated through (1) the social
structure, (2) the culture and (3) the civilization.”21
Multi-institutional or multi-departmental interactions are rife with opportunities to create
incongruities that set the stage for unintended consequences, especially when combined with the
inexactness of human agency.22 As Kenneth Goldberg highlights, “decisions made by one
stakeholder…can have consequences on other stakeholders.”23 Interconnectedness, both within
19

Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” 904.
Ibid., 895, 897; Perri 6, "Explaining Unintended and Unexpected Consequences of Policy Decisions: Comparing
Three British Governments, 1959-74," 674; Baert, “Unintended Consequences: A Typology and Examples,” 202203; Engelhard and Wind, “Educational Testing and Schooling: Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social
Action,” 33.
21
Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” 895.
22
Cortell and Peterson, “Limiting the Unintended Consequences of Institutional Change,” 774.
23
Kenneth Goldberg, “Mitigating unintended consequences during crisis: improving the decision-making process,”
Journal of Behavorial Studies in Business 6 (October 2013): 1.
20
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and across organizations, creates an inherent complexity. This engenders a fertile environment
for unintended consequences, which challenges decision makers due to its effect on the action of
policymaking and the concomitant ripples across organizational boundaries.24
Richard Vernon further argues that unintended consequences are born from “the
cumulative outcome of similar actions performed simultaneously or consequently by a number of
actors” or “from the simultaneous or consecutive performance of dissimilar actions by
individuals or groups…arising from a diversity of ends.”25 In Vernon’s description, they are the
net result of numerous independent actors making decisions perceived to be in their own best
interest.26 According to Merton, “precisely because a particular action is not carried out in
a…vacuum, its effects will ramify into other spheres of value and interest.”27 Even if the limits
to human reasoning and knowledge were overcome, this effect would survive with unintended
consequences continuing unabated.28 Based on the overall description presented in this section
of the report thus far, this author readily agrees with Perri 6 that “unintended consequences are
not ‘problems’ that can be ‘solved’. Their aetiology constitutes a condition to be managed.”29
V.

RETENTION
With the concept of a condition to be managed in mind, this report turns briefly to a

discussion of retention. Employee turnover and retention are key concerns for any organization,
whether in the for-profit, not-for-profit, or government sectors. Human capital is vital to the
health of an institution, particularly over the long-term. According to a 2018 survey briefing by
24

Ibid., 2; Mavrodiev, “Decisions and Their Unintended Consequences,” 4;
Richard Vernon, “Unintended Consequences,” Political Theory 7, no. 1 (February 1979): 59, 63.
26
Ibid., 64.
27
Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” 902.
28
Mavrodiev, “Decisions and Their Unintended Consequences,” 4.
29
Aetiology (etiology) is defined as the cause, set of causes, or manner of causation of a condition
(https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/aetiology); the study of causation
(http://www.dictionary.com/browse/etiology). Perri 6, "Explaining Unintended and Unexpected Consequences of
Policy Decisions: Comparing Three British Governments, 1959-74," 690.
25
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the Society for Human Resource Management and Globoforce, retention/turnover was the top
concern for 47 percent of human resource managers. This was followed by recruitment at 36
percent. In combination, this shows that gaining and retaining talented employees for their
organizations dominates the concerns of human resource managers.30 This is unsurprising given
that, as Robert Cardy and Mark Lengnick-Hall highlight, “human capital remains one of the few
resources that can provide a sustainable competitive advantage.”31
Thomas Lee, et al., provide some reasons for the human resource managers concerns.
The process for new hires can cost 200 percent annual salary. Customers can be lost due to the
damage turnover can induce to relationships. Experienced performers take that experience with
them, which damages organizational performance and outcomes. Lee, et al., also discuss the
dispiriting effect on those left behind due to the loss of teammates and the increased burdens that
have to be carried until departing members are replaced, as well as how a “turnover spiral” can
result.32
Authors elucidate various approaches to improving employee retention. Lori Goler, et
al., highlighted that turnover occurs because an employee’s “job wasn’t enjoyable, their strengths
weren’t being used, and they weren’t growing in their careers.”33 Hence, improved retention
centers on managers finding ways to “enable them to do work they enjoy, help them play to their
strengths, and carve a path for career development that accommodates personal priorities.”34

30

“Using Recognition and Other Workplace Efforts to Engage Employees,” Society for Human Resource
Management, January 24, 2018, https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-andsurveys/pages/employee-recognition-2018.aspx.
31
Robert L. Cardy and Mark L. Lengnick-Hall, “Will They Stay or Will They Go? Exploring a Customer-Oriented
Approach to Employee Retention,” Journal of Business and Psychology 26, no. 2 (2011): 213.
32
Thomas W. Lee, Peter Hom, Marion Eberly, Junchao (Jason) Li, “Managing employee retention and turnover with
21st century ideas,” Organizational Dynamics (September 2017): 1.
33
Lori Goler, Janelle Gale, Brynn Harrington, and Adam Grant, “Why People Really Quit Their Jobs,” Harvard
Business Review, January 11, 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/01/why-people-really-quit-their-jobs/.
34
Ibid.
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Cardy and Lengnick-Hall’s employee equity model “predicts that investment in a
combination of socialization and training activities that create strong identification with a firm’s
mission, values, and ethical orientation will yield loyalty, satisfaction, and retention.”35 They
further posit three main themes in relation to employee retention decisions: 1) employees will
respond in kind to their perception of how the organization treats them, 2) employees evaluate
whether or not their impression of the firm’s “brand equity” aligns with how they perceive
themselves, and 3) an employee’s feeling of connectedness to the organization, which they
evaluate through investments in their development, impacts their decision.36
Two further items, in particular, ring true for the subject of this report. First, Amy
Benton illuminated that “an important component of POS [perceived organizational support] is
the idea that stressors will reduce POS to the extent that they are perceived as controllable by
[the] organization.”37 Second, Lee, et al., added that “on-boarding activities are crucial for
stemming quits among new hires who are most quit prone primarily because they fail to ‘learn
the ropes’ or find that organizational realities are worse than they had initially expected.”38
As this report progresses through the discussion of the main topic at hand, security
clearance-based delays, echoes of violations of these retention concepts will be apparent. While
this report will not examine the direct impacts on retention of the workplace access issue,
anecdotal evidence over my almost twenty-four-year career suggests an effect. What is more,
2017 retention statistics for first-term airmen in the cryptologic Air Force Specialty Codes

35

Cardy and Lengnick-Hall, “Will They Stay or Will They Go? Exploring a Customer-Oriented Approach to Employee
Retention,” 214.
36
Ibid., 214-215.
37
Amy D. Benton, “Understanding the diverging paths of stayers and leavers: An examination of factors predicting
worker retention,” Children and Youth Services Review 65 (2016): 71.
38
Lee, et al., “Managing employee retention and turnover with 21st century ideas,” 2.
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(AFSC) leaves room for this speculation.39 The overall average reenlistment rate for these
AFSCs in FY17 was 50 percent, while the most affected group, 1N3s, reported in at 40.2
percent. For reference, the Air Force’s average for first-term airmen in all AFSCs was 63.4
percent. This potential downstream unintended consequence of upstream decisions made
relative to security accesses is worthy of more focused research by someone in the future.
VI.

PROJECT BACKGROUND, RATIONALE, AND METHODOLOGY

a. Twenty-Fifth Air Force
The Twenty-Fifth Air Force (25 AF) is headquartered at Joint Base San Antonio—
Lackland, Texas. Twenty-Fifth is the United States Air Force’s intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) Numbered Air Force (NAF). Its lineage dates back to 1948 with the
creation of the United States Air Force Security Service. Over the intervening timeframe, 25 AF
has also been known as the Electronic Security Command, Air Force Intelligence Command, Air
Intelligence Agency, and Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency. Its
current designation occurred in September 2014. Approximately 30,000 active duty, National
Guard, reserve, and civilian personnel are assigned to the NAF’s headquarters, operations center,
and seven wings at 75 locations around the globe. These personnel conduct ISR operations, as
well as command-and-control activities, in support of national-level peacetime and tactical-level
warfighting for all combatant commanders in the Department of Defense. Additionally, they
provide multisource intelligence products, applications, capabilities, resources, and expertise.
The NAF also serves as the Service Cryptologic Component responsible for all Air Force matters
related to the NSA.
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The cryptologic AFSCs include: 1N3: Cryptologic Language Analyst, 1N4: Fusion Analyst, 1N2: Signals Intelligence
Analyst, 1A8X1: Airborne Cryptologic Language Analyst, and 1A8X2: Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Operator.
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In order to meet our mission, airmen must access work centers and aircraft. A longstanding issue exists with airmen moving to NSA locations (or sites with NSA equipment
required to conduct the mission) and being unable to get cleared to work for extended periods of
time—sometimes in excess of a year.
b. Security Clearance Process
A lack of security clearance processing timeliness is not a problem confined to our
organization, nor is it a recent problem. The security clearance process has long suffered from
lengthy delays; however, it has gotten worse. The National Background Investigations Bureau, a
subordinate agency of the Office of Personnel Management, had a backlog of more than 709,000
cases (includes all security clearance levels) in September 2017, a significant increase over the
190,000-case backlog in 2014. Only 10 percent of top secret clearances are processed within the
desired timeframe, down from 26 percent in 2016 and 59 percent in 2012. The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 called for 80 percent of cases to be completed in
90 days. By the end of 2017, the average processing time for a top secret clearance exceeded
500 days. For reference, in 2014, the average was 77 days. Much of the blame for recent issues
has fallen on the 2014 decision to cancel the contract of the United States Investigative Service, a
private firm that handled approximately 60 percent of cases, after it suffered a major data breach.
This change removed 65 percent of investigators from the process.40
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Joseph Marks, “Yes, The Security Clearance Backlog is Getting Worse,” NextGov, December 13, 2017,
http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2017/12/yes-security-backlog-getting-worse/144534/; Johnson, “NBIB
confirms 700,000 security clearance backlog”; Lyndy Kyzer, “Security Clearance Processing Times in 2017: Slow,
Stagnant, Stalled,” ClearanceJobs.com, December 27, 2017, https://news.clearancejobs.com/2017/12/27/statesecurity-clearance-processing-times-2017-slow-stagnant-stalled/; Nicole Ogrysko and Scott Maucione, “How a 3year-old decision still haunts OPM’s security clearance efforts,” Federal News Radio, November 15, 2017,
https://federalnewsradio.com/opm/2017/11/how-a-3-year-old-decision-still-haunts-opms-security-clearanceefforts/; Derek B. Johnson, “GAO: Security clearance problems far from fixed,” Defense Systems, December 12,
2017, https://defensesystems.com/articles/2017/12/14/clearance-gao-johnson.aspx/; Merton Miller, “The State of
the Security Clearance Process: How We Got Here and Where We’re Going,” Clearancejobs.com, 2018, 2, 6,
https://about.clearancejobs.com/employers/recruiting-resources/the-state-of-the-security-clearance-process.
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The security clearance process contains a number of steps. These include:
1. Airmen complete the electronic SF 86 (Questionnaire for Investigation Processing) in
pursuit of Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) access
2. The initial processing office submits SF 86, electronic fingerprints, AF 2583 (request for
security action)
3. Office of Personnel Management (OPM)/National Background Investigations Bureau
(NBIB) opens investigation
a. Consists of FBI record checks, credit reports, reference/neighbor interviews, etc.
4. When OPM/NBIB opens the investigation and the National Agency Check (NAC) is
completed, an interim SCI clearance can be requested/submitted to the DoD Consolidated
Adjudication Facility (DoD CAF)
5. A subject interview must be completed and submitted to the DoD CAF when requesting
interim SCI clearances, which consists of 11 prescreening questions
6. If an interim SCI is disapproved by the DoD CAF or the OPM/NBIB investigation is
already closed, then the airmen must wait until the case is favorable adjudicated by the
DoD CAF
7. DoD CAF will/can disapprove an interim SCI requests based on answers to prescreening
questions, additional information in the Airman's record, or missing information
8. Airmen are scheduled for indoctrination into SCI access when OPM/NBIB investigations
are favorable adjudicated by the DoD CAF
9. Polygraphs are administered as needed
10. NSA Military Affairs Division (MADO) adjudicates personnel for duty at NSA locations
Of note, NSA does not accept interim security clearances and has instituted a five-year
polygraph currency requirement for cyber personnel. The previous was seven years.
c. Methodology
For the purposes of this report, tracked data consisted of open OPM/NBIB priority
personnel security investigations (PSI) and DoD CAF adjudications, MADO security holds, and
counter-intelligence polygraph (ci-polygraph) requirements for individuals requiring access to
NSA sites or systems. Of note, the report only tracked priority PSIs, not ones designated as
standard. MADO holds greater than 30 days in duration represented a major interest item. Data
was collected on a weekly basis. Moreover, while the motivation of the report was speeding up
the processing of airmen at NSA sites, OAP activity examined each step of the process
previously detailed for opportunities to make improvements. Fundamentally, opportunity to
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improve the situation was seized wherever it could be found. Using the institutional data
collected, I utilized Air Force Instruction (AFI) 65-503 (US Air Force Cost and Planning
Factors) to apply costs to define the original state of affairs and determine the impact of
improvements.
I was not organizationally sponsored, so I was not constrained in the pursuit of a project
by my supervision. Given my line of work, one consideration I had to be attentive to was
avoiding any topic that could stray into the classified realm. This project met that criteria.
As one of my six Divisions is responsible for personnel security, this OAP topic directly
fell within my current positional responsibilities, but required us to interact with MAJCOMlevel, Air Force-level, and National Security Agency security professionals to enact change.
Initiatives in this space are important to my immediate commander and our upstream leadership.
Furthermore, this issue directly nested within three of the four newly published organizational
priorities: 1) Restore Readiness, Drive, Innovation, and Anticipate Tomorrow, 2) Develop and
Strengthen our Dedicated Professionals and their Families, and 3) Plan and Execute Today’s
Fight.41 The significant loss of manpower and productivity entailed in the situation created a
burning platform for change.
VII.

TWENTY-FIFTH AIR FORCE DATA

As has been previously indicated, the principle objective of this OAP was to pursue
solution sets that lower the time airmen spend unable to do their job at NSA sites or on NSA
systems due to security clearance-based delays. Every day saved represented a cost savings for
the US Air Force. The initial numbers were not heartening. I utilized January 12, 2018 data, as
that coincided with the timing of RP1, to open the reporting cycle. On that date, we tracked 985

41

Twenty-Fifth Air Force Mission, Vision, Priorities—see Appendix A.
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total airmen who were unable to access NSA sites or systems due to this issue. Three
components made up that number (see FIGURE 1): 1) 446 priority personnel security clearance
cases required either OPM/NBIB closure or DoD CAF adjudication, 2) 90 individuals required
ci-polygraphs, and 3) 449 personnel were in MADO hold status (those in excess of 30 days
totaled 173). Numbers in all tracked categories fluctuated from week-to-week as cases were
removed and new ones added.

FIGURE 1: Total Personnel Unable to Access NSA Sites or Systems on 12 Jan 2018
The primary personnel affected fell into the following AFSCs:
-

1N3: Cryptologic Language Analyst
1N4: Fusion Analyst
1N2: Signals Intelligence Analyst
1A8X1: Airborne Cryptologic Language Analyst
1A8X2: Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operator
3D: Client Systems (non-intelligence AFSC)
14N: Intelligence Officer
17D: Cyberspace Operations Officer (non-intelligence AFSC)
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Based on data collected from the field, it was determined that roughly 78 percent of the numbers
represented intelligence AFSCs. The largest number were 1N3s at 70 percent of the total.
To present a cost perspective to the Air Force, the following data was utilized. The
average cost to the Air Force per year for pay and benefits is $91,103 for an enlisted airman and
$169,197 for an officer. These figures include the ‘with permanent change of station’ (PCS) rate
as that is applicable to virtually all of the individuals captured in the data. Further costs include
foreign language proficiency pay (FLPP) for the 1N3s and 1A8X1s, selective retention bonuses
(SRB) for certain enlisted AFSCs, and flight pay for 1A8X1s and 1A8X2s. FLPP is based on
both how the language is categorized and the proficiency score. A minimum 2/2
(reading/listening) score is required to graduate training and to receive FLPP. At 2/2, an
individual receives $125-$200 depending on the language. An individual can receive no more
than $500 per month for one language or $1000 for two or more languages at the highest score
(4/4). SRBs are pertinent to the 1N3, 1N4, 1A8X1 and 1A8X2 career fields currently. This is
based on a multiplier, base pay, and the length of reenlistment. For example, a Staff Sergeant
(SSgt/E-5) in the 1N3 or 1N4 career fields reenlisting at the six-year point receives $23,402 for a
four your enlistment ($2925.30 [base pay only per month] x 2 [career field multiplier] x 4
[number of years on reenlistment); whereas, a 1A8X1 and a 1A8X2 receive $70,207 and $46,805
respectively for the same timeframe. A maximum of $90,000 is allowed. Flight pay for 1A8X1s
and 1A8X2s is $600 per month.42
42

Secretary of the Air Force, US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors, AFI 65-503 (Washington, D.C.: Department of
the Air Force, February 4, 1994, incorporating Change1, February 23, 2017); Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force
Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus Program, AFI 36-4002 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, June
16, 2015); Robins Area Audit Office, National Security Agency Access 480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Group, Fort Gordon, GA, F2017-0024-RES000 (Robins AFB, GA: Air Force Audit Agency, August 10,
2017); “Enlisted Air Force Ranks,” Military.com, https://www.military.com/air-force/enlisted-ranks.html/; Stephen
Losey, “Air Force cuts re-up bonuses for dozens of jobs — but you still have a chance to cash in,” Air Force Times,
February 6, 2018, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/02/06/air-force-cuts-re-up-bonusesfor-dozens-of-jobs-but-you-still-have-a-chance-to-cash-in/ and https://partner-mco-

20

Putting that all together yielded the following rough indication of annual costs. For the
purposes of example, an enlisted SSgt in the 1N3 career field at the six-year mark of a career,
who reenlisted for four years and PCSed to an NSA site, was utilized. This was a good
representative of the population in question. Officers represented a small percentage of the
population and were not factored in specifically. Base cost for pay and benefits were $91,103.
To this was added one year of their SRB at $5,851. Since a 2/2 designated the minimum score
required to earn FLPP that was used to calculate an annual figure of $2,400 since most of our
languages fall in the upper category. Together that yielded $99,354 per 1N3 per year. In the
same vein, a 1N4 cost $96,954, a 1N2 or 3D $91,103, a 1A8X2 $98,303, and a 1A8X1 $106,554.

FIGURE 2: Total Personnel Cost on 12 Jan 2018

archive.s3.amazonaws.com/client_files/1517949775.pdf/; Stephen Lousy, “Air Force ups monthly flight pay for
officers, enlisted air crew,” Air Force Times, August 25, 2017, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-airforce/2017/08/25/air-force-ups-monthly-flight-pay-for-officers-enlisted-air-crew/
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Applying those numbers to the 12 January 2018 figure of 985 personnel unable to gain
the access needed to do their jobs produced an annual cost estimate of $95,984,348.43 (see
FIGURE 2) OPM/NBIB closures and DoD CAF adjudication constituted $43,462,786 of this
figure with 446 personnel in that status, while ci-polygraphs represented $8,768,965 due to 90
individuals on hold for that item.44 For the third component, MADO holds, the estimate was
$43,752,597.45 This yielded an average of $97,448 per person per year. No allocation for initial
training costs was factored in this total, which ranged from a low of $51,286 for a 3D to a high of
$153,664 for a 1A8X1. For reference, an Air Force Audit Agency report placed the average cost
at $96,026 per person or $263 per person per day.46
These were only the dollar-based numerical costs. Missed in the numbers were the
impacts on overall unit mission readiness, as well as reduced training and career development
opportunities for those who continued to stay on mission due to lack of a backfill. Intelligence
exploitation suffered as some items took longer than desired to process or simply were not
processed. For those in leadership and supervisory positions, turnover frequently could not
occur since one party was still ‘outside-the-wire’ as the incumbent departed for a new duty
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Assuming average total figure of 985 across the year, 78 percent intel AFSCs (70 percent 1N3s & 8 percent other
intel AFSCs [1N4/1N2/1A8X1/1A8X2]) and 22 percent non-intel AFSCs. OPM/NBIB & DoD CAF: $43,462,786 + cipolygraph: $8,768,965 + MADO holds: $43,752,597 = $95,984,348. No attempts to include officer data, which
would be higher, were made due to the low numbers involved.
44
OPM/NBIB & DoD CAF adjudication--1N3: 1): 312 [70 percent of 446] x $99,354 [annual cost per
person]=$30,998,448; 1N4/1N2/1A8X1/1A8X2: 36 [remaining 8 percent of intel AFSCs] x $98,229 [avg of the cost
per year of those four AFSCs]=$3,536,244; non-intel AFSCs: 98 [22 percent of total] x $91,103 [enlisted average
cost per year for pay and benefits with PCS]=$8,928,094—total is $43,462,786; CI-Polygraph—1N3 (63 x
$99,354)=$6,259,302; 1N4/1N2/1A8X1/1A8X2 (7 x $98,229)=$687,603; non-intel AFSCs (20 x
$91,103)=$1,822,060.
45
MADO holds—1N3 (314 x $99,354) = $31,197,156; 1N4/1N2/1A8X1/1A8X2 (36 x $98,229) = $3,536,244; nonintel AFSCs (99 x $91,103) = $9,019,197. Total = $43,752,597 (449 people).
46
For additional training cost reference: 1N3 = $111,400; 1N4 = $56,506; 1N2 = $60,102; 14N = $70,109; 17D =
$64,456. Secretary of the Air Force, US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors, AFI 65-503, A18-1A, A18-1B; Air Force
Audit Agency, “National Security Agency Access 480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Group Fort
Gordon GA,” Installation Report of Audit F2017-0024-RES000, Robins Area Audit Office (10 August 2017), Tab A
page 2.
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location. Besides, airmen in outside-the-wire status suffered a morale impact. Throughout
technical training these airmen were told how great their jobs were going to be and how
important they were only to arrive and be unable to perform those functions for an extended
period. This was not just applicable to new technical school graduates. It also affected
experienced personnel who transferred from one NSA site to another. While statistically
relevant research data does not yet exist, as was previously stated, anecdotal indications point
toward an impact on retention.
VIII. STEPS TAKEN
We tracked the data relevant to the issue and published it weekly via e-mail to an
audience that included our NAF commander and our MAJCOM (Air Combat Command—ACC)
Director of Intelligence, as well as some of their senior staff and our wing commanders. This
kept the status of the issue fresh on all parties’ minds and the lines of communication open. Our
senior leadership was very engaged and quite concerned about results.
a. Priority Status
An important initial action my security office took was obtaining permission at the
Secretary of the Air Force (SAF) and Headquarters Air Force (HAF) levels to designate 25 AF
cases with a priority label. Code ‘A’ Priority status is designed to yield a 137-day expedited
processing timeline for the OPM/NBIB investigation step in the process. The current average is
154 days from the time we designate a case so that goal is not being met. For comparison,
OPM/NBIB averages 415 days for standard cases. The cost to the Air Force for the upgraded
status is $600 per case, a small expenditure compared to the personnel costs I calculated. We
receive notifications of priority case requirements from our field units and forward those to
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OPM/NBIB. This process is extremely helpful in expediting cases. A number of steps were
pursued to work in concert with and support this action.
b. SAF/AAZ Working Groups
After visiting our organization and being briefed on the current state of the issue, the
Director, Security, Special Program Oversight, and Information Protection in the Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/AAZ) championed the organization of two security working
groups that my security division participated in. The function of these meetings was to locate
areas where the Air Force could make improvements in its procedures to gain some efficiencies
in the clearance process. A number of action steps resulted from this effort.
First, on the officer front, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets will now
submit their security clearance paperwork in the fall of their junior year rather than waiting until
after graduation, which had been the norm. This was also extended to include Air Force
Academy (USAFA) cadets. Waiting until after graduation historically resulted in training and
assignment delays. The security clearance paperwork for individuals designated as intelligence
officers will also be placed in priority status. Headquarters Air Force Personnel Directorate (A1)
is lead for monitoring ROTC detachment and USAFA compliance with this action.
Second, the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) now only assigns intelligence or cyber
officers exiting technical training with fully adjudicated clearances to NSA locations. A “no
interim clearance” designator is placed in the qualifications section to facilitate this. The change
will catch Lieutenants and cross-trainees. Individuals with interims are sent to other assignment
options. This is in keeping with NSA’s prohibition on allowing individuals with interim
clearances to access their sites or systems.
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Third, a test program was initiated to designate 1N2s (Signals Intelligence Analyst) and
1N4s (Fusion Analyst) as priority clearance cases at the Military Entrance Processing Station
(MEPS). This is an early point in the military accessions process after discussions with a
recruiter and prior to basic military training (BMT) at Joint Base San Antonio—Lackland, Texas.
After starting the program with the 1N2s/1N4s, a decision was made to expand prioritization to
all intelligence related AFSCs at MEPS.
Initial indications were not good. Personnel in these AFSCs continued to arrive at their
duty locations without fully adjudicated clearances. Poor quality control of SF-86 (national
security questionnaire) packages by personnel at MEPS allowed applications with errors to enter
the system, slowing down the process. On the surface, I and an Air Education and Training
Command Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Analysis,
Assessments, and Lessons Learned (AETC A2/9) representative agreed that quality control of
the SF-86 was likely not viewed as a priority, moving individuals through the system was. This
is something AETC A2/9 took for action to engage their Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS)
counterparts about. AFRS is a subordinate organization of AETC.
Supporting this, a one-week data sample of personnel at BMT in October showed that 31
percent of trainees’ paperwork had not been completed during the pre-BMT phase. However, on
a more positive note, 22 percent already had fully adjudicated clearances half way through BMT.
Obviously, more work remains to be done on this front.
Moving to another AETC site, trainees with follow-on assignments at NSA locations or
who were not granted interim clearance status are being prioritized at the 17th Training Group
(17 TRG) at Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas. The 17 TRG processes about
3,300 intelligence airmen per year. Presently, approximately 2,400 of these need to be actioned
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at Goodfellow AFB; however, if the above MEPS initiatives improve that should fall toward
zero for enlisted airmen. Moreover, a video teleconference including SAF/AAZ, OPM/NBIB,
and my organization led to a decision by OPM/NBIB to explore a surge action for the cases
currently at the 17 TRG in an attempt to close all cases prior to training conclusion to get those
into the DoD CAF process.
Another initiative out of the working groups centered on a desire to move security
paperwork review/screening from week four or five of BMT to week one. This was initially
agreed to by AETC representatives. We discovered later, however, that it did not occur due to a
reticence to interfere with the established BMT processes. Upon discovering this, we engaged
with our AETC A2/9 colleagues and started other actions that will be further discussed later.
c. Navy Recruiting Training Command
We decided that a trip to the Navy’s Recruitment Training Command (RTC) at Great
Lakes, Illinois was warranted. RTC is the Navy’s equivalent to Air Force BMT. The purpose of
the trip was to review Navy clearance paperwork screening techniques to determine if there were
any practices potentially applicable to the Air Force since the Navy has a high clearance
acceptance rate with NSA.
One item that will not translate is that sailors, who are cryptologic technicians,
intelligence specialists, and information technicians, spend their entire careers inside of 10th
Fleet/Fleet Cyber Command, whereas Air Force airmen move between MAJCOMs. This gives
the Naval Service Cryptologic component the ability to track sailors throughout their careers and
identify any potential security concerns. Representatives interview sailors in these career fields
during the first week of training to vet them, giving the Navy roughly a month head start on the
Air Force process. Each sailor has a one-on-one interview, which is recorded. Furthermore,
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they are required to complete an 18-page security questionnaire to determine if they will
continue to be sponsored for the career field they are slated for. If a determination is made that a
sailor will be a difficult case, they are reclassified. Credit reports are also reviewed by screeners.
For example, $1,000 in delinquent debt will disqualify an individual, as will foreign national
associations from countries designated as high threat. After this, all remaining cases are ranked
with only ‘clean cases’ slated for NSA sites/missions.
Eight (RTC) interviewers cover 3,700 sailors per year. For comparison, the Air Force
attempted to screen 5,200 airmen per year with four screeners, leading to a much less in-depth
review. With this practice sailors have at least an interim clearance prior to completing RTC.
Anyone disapproved for an interim is disqualified and reclassified into another career field.
Navy processes result in a 99 percent acceptance rate with NSA—up from 80-87 percent prior to
the institution of these actions. It is estimated that this reduces the number of sailors outside-thewire at NSA sites by more than 400 personnel.
d. AETC A2/9 Partnership
Out of this visit, a number of action items occurred in our partnership with AETC A2/9 to
approach the BMT process. A2/9 provided a list of all AFSCs filling out the SF-86 at BMT so
we could review its comprehensiveness. After review, we provided them a list of our affected
AFSCs. Additionally, we pursued a list from MADO of items causing long-term
holds/disqualifications from NSA facilities, as well as the 356-item questionnaire used by NSA,
for potential incorporation into BMT screening and communication to recruiters.
AETC A2/9 also hosted a continuous process improvement event led by its Lean Six
Sigma black belts in October. Post-event efforts were launched by multiple actors to: 1) develop
a training guide for recruiters to better understand the paperwork involved and its importance, 2)
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establish clear standards for foreign contacts, 3) standardize all clearance screening forms, 4)
submit interim clearance requests earlier at the Defense Language Institute, and 5) develop a
more manpower efficient method for the recruiting service to submit priority investigations to
OPM/NBIB. Another major item being investigated relates to paperwork collection. Presently,
OPM/NBIB investigators are required to personally collect all documentation like high school
diplomas, college transcripts, birth certificates, et cetera, when the Air Force already collects
these. If OPM/NBIB proves able to accept the Air Force procured documents once law and
policy are reviewed, it is estimated that up to half of the NBIB timeline could be eliminated.
Other efforts are being worked but the above list provides a representative look.
In order to better match the manpower utilized by the Navy at RTC, my organization
successfully pursued the funds to acquire four contractors to double the pre-screening staff at
BMT. We received approval in August and the contractors began work in October. The total
annual cost is $311K. Improved screening should reduce SF-86 errors and omissions, which
slow down the overall process, as well as lead to more effective disqualification procedures. An
additional benefit is faster paperwork submissions for those who are reclassified into one of our
AFSCs during BMT. Any improvements that eventually result will benefit the Air Force as a
whole and not just our 25 AF units given all the AFSCs affected. The savings estimate for every
day the contract screeners eliminate from the current timeline average is $263 per person per
day, a total of roughly $216K per day at the current outstanding population of 822.
To put the importance of these AETC-related upstream processes into perspective, the
average Air Force accession spends 120 days in the delayed entry program phase prior to starting
BMT. Some spend as much as a year. If this valuable time is maximized by having clearance
paperwork submitted early and accurately, more and more trainees should depart BMT with a
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fully adjudicated clearance in place. This would dramatically lower the number of personnel
who cannot access NSA sites. Our contract BMT screeners will also enhance our ability to track
data on the effectiveness of the upstream changes previously described.
e. MADO
An important event was the arrival of a new NSA MADO chief who was an excellent
partner in pursuing positive change. This is key given that we have the ability to request,
suggest, and propose but not to dictate actions in this relationship.
NSA now accepts site-to-site transfers. Formerly, an airman leaving one NSA site to
PCS to another had to go through the entire MADO vetting process again. Previously approved
non-reported foreign national association (NFNA) forms now also follow an airman between
sites as long as no changes are required. The MADO goal is to process ‘clean case’ reviews
within three business days of arrival. Clean cases include those with a fully adjudicated
clearance, no unreported foreign national contacts, and an up-to-date ci-polygraph. Furthermore,
foreign contact information can now be submitted to MADO prior to PCSing in order to help
expedite processing.
In another change, security information packages (SIP) for PCSing airmen are being
accepted up to six months out. MADO reps predicted that nearly 95 percent of those will be preapproved by the airman’s arrival if submitted at least 120 days prior. To enable this, units need
to monitor their gains rosters and submit the names as early as possible.
The site-to-site transfer process did not start smoothly. The core problem was a nonstandardized approach that resulted in requests being missed in e-mail queues. This was
addressed by standardizing the subject lines of e-mail traffic. After that course correction, there
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was evidence that the change is actually achieving results. However, the process remains overly
manual.
To address that, we pursued a web-based information technology solution called the
Clearance Workforce and Verification System (CWVS—pronounced sea waves). A $1.04M
unfunded request was submitted into the headquarters FY18 unfunded requirements drill and we
received notification in June that this request received funding approval from the 25 AF
commander. Once implemented, it will work as follows: 1) an airman receives assignment
notification for an NSA site, 2) they are directed to a URL to complete their SIP and foreign
contact additional access sheet, 3) the security screening process starts, and 4) the gaining
security office is notified automatically and can track paperwork as soon as the airman enters it.
CWVS will benefit all services, not just the Air Force. MADO estimates that it will save
$7.2M per year in service personnel costs on the low end. My estimate is that at least $1.4M per
year in cost savings will benefit the Air Force. Work began to create the tool in September. The
timeline for implementation is one year, so the results that accrue from it will not be apparent by
the end of this OAP cycle.
Another issue we tackled related to personnel joining the Air National Guard at NSA
sites. Individuals, who cleared the MADO vetting process and were working at a site as civilian
employees, contractors, or as active duty airmen, were being required to repeat MADO vetting to
gain access while in National Guard status. This was true even if the individual remained an
NSA civilian employee during the week and performed as a National Guard member on the
weekends. Essentially, they were being treated as two separate people for processing purposes.
My security office engaged MADO leadership on this topic and it was quickly changed,
removing those people from the backlog.
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f. CI-Polygraphs
Turning to the ci-polygraph front, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI)
agreed to stand up a two-person detachment at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska to address Air
Force ci-polygraph requirements at that location. This primarily addresses our personnel at the
55th Wing. Two years of data demonstrated that the volume of demand warranted the stand up
of this unit.
Additionally, I recommended that a personnel processing code (PPC) be added to the
billets of all airmen PCSing to one of our overseas groups. This PPC code will require that an
airman have a current ci-polygraph prior to being issued orders for the move. This is key in
overseas locations given that all airmen arrive with a ‘date estimated return from overseas’
(DEROS). The DEROS establishes when a PCS from an overseas location will happen. Thus,
outside-the-wire time overseas is even more costly for the organization in mission terms than
stateside. Higher headquarters approved the code’s addition.
Finally, the Director of NSA mandated that all individuals working in the computer
network operations line of effort now have a ci-polygraph within the last five years as opposed to
the previous standard of seven years, affecting roughly 600 of our airmen and placing greater
demand on the system. My security team worked with AFOSI to draft a plan to rapidly handle
55 individuals who were immediately affected. As part of that process, AFOSI representatives
indicated that the organization could handle the increased demand. For reference, these 600
airmen will now be due every five years, while our remaining 3,400 will continue to be on the
seven-year cycle.
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IX.

RESULTS

a. Overall
Visible results of our actions taken to date were evident. Conversely, given the nature of
some changes, as well as the fact that others will not be in place by the end of the OAP reporting
cycle, the results of many will not occur during this project period. The largest issue remains the
OPM/NBIB processing timeline. Be that as it may, we pursued any opportunity at any step in
the process, to include those either upstream or downstream from OPM/NBIB, in an attempt to
achieve effects. Given the scope of the issue, every day saved was important.

FIGURE 3: Total Personnel Unable to Access NSA Sites or Systems
During the reporting period, the total personnel unable to access NSA sites or systems in
our three categories (1—OPM/NBIB & DoD CAF security investigations, 2—ci-polygraphs, and
3—MADO holds) dropped from 985 on 12 January 2018 to 822 on 26 October—a 17 percent
decrease. (see FIGURE 3) Commensurately, total personnel costs dropped from $95,984,348 to
$80,136,624, a net improvement of $15,847,724. (see FIGURE 4)
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FIGURE 4: Total Personnel Costs of the Process
b. OPM/NBIB & DoD CAF
Digging deeper into these numbers, one sees that the total number of 25 AF security
investigations requiring OPM/NBIB closure and DoD CAF adjudication increased from 446 to
550 personnel—a 23 percent increase. Consequently, the personnel costs contained in this
category rose from $43,462,786 to $53,631,963—up $10,169,177. (see FIGURES 5 & 6)
Five factors impacted the direction of the data throughout the OAP cycle. First, we
noticed a negative trend in DoD CAF timeliness. On 12 January, the average adjudication time
was 14 days, a figure that rose to 99 days by the end of June. It rested at 76 days at the end of
October. Second, OPM/NBIB processing of priority cases also slowed. When we began
monitoring in March, cases were closing in an average of 100 days. That climbed to 154 days by
October.
Third, average new case additions outpaced those closed and adjudicated by 21 per
month throughout the OAP period. In total 226 more were added than processed. Given that, a
rolling average of 672 cases pending rather than the 550 we finished with was likely if upstream
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actions were not already having effects. If accurate, those upstream changes potentially resulted
in a savings of about $11.9M.

FIGURE 5: 25 AF Priority Security Investigations Requiring Closure & DoD CAF Adjudication

FIGURE 6: Personnel Costs of OPM/NBIB Closure & DoD CAF Adjudication
Fourth, these numbers were affected by a 100-person spike in July due to inaccurate
previous reporting by two subordinate organizations. These were not new arrivals but
individuals the units did not report for priority status on their arrival. This created a large bump
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in the backlog. Due to the difficulty of determining when all of those personnel arrived, I did not
adjust the previous months’ totals even though the starting points for each month in this OAP
were likely higher. More serious than the data tracking was the time lost in getting personnel
access to accomplish their jobs.
Fifth, a technical complication for DoD CAF processing arose during the year. DoD
replaced the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) with the Defense Information System
for Security (DISS). NSA continues to use JPAS only and we discovered that the two systems
were not communicating, necessitating the entry of DoD CAF adjudications into both systems on
an individual by individual basis. Not all adjudicators were entering data into both. We became
aware of this in October as we dug into the rise in the DoD CAF backlog.
My security shop now manually reviews our entire list each week to ensure favorable
adjudications are accounted for. Additionally, MADO is attempting to get DISS accounts for its
personnel. Another step we are pursuing with our MAJCOM is placing a civilian employee or
contractor permanently in DoD CAF to serve as our liaison. This individual could work on
technical issues like the above as they arise, as well as attempt to keep our cases processing in a
timely manner. This concept remains in the discussion stage.
c. CI-Polygraph
CI-polygraph numbers changed little over the reporting cycle. In January, 90 personnel
were waiting on ci-polygraphs. This figure was 99 in October. (see FIGURE 7) The costing
data moved from $8,768,965 to $9,645,862, an increase of $876,897. (see FIGURE 8) This area
was also affected by a data reporting issue. One subordinate organization did not account for 44
personnel requiring ci-polygraphs, a situation that was uncovered in September and that accounts
for the large increase in requirements seen in Figure 7. Essentially, this wiped out the gains
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made in this category for the year. As with the OPM/NBIB and DoD CAF data, no attempt to
recalculate the previous months’ totals was attempted.

FIGURE 7: Personnel Requiring CI-Polygraphs

FIGURE 8: CI-Polygraph Personnel Costs
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d. MADO Holds
The area with the largest improvement was MADO holds. Resting at 449 in January, the
number fell across the reporting period to 173. This yielded a 61 percent improvement.
Moreover, the personnel costs tied up in this grouping, which totaled $43,752,597 in January,
fell to $16,858,799, a savings of $26,893,798 to the Air Force. (see FIGURE 9) Noteworthy is
that holds greater than 30 days fell from 173 airmen in this group at the beginning of the project
to 93 at the conclusion—down by 46 percent. (see FIGURE 10) While every hold matters, these
longer-term ones are especially troubling to our wings.

FIGURE 9: Total MADO Holds & Associated Personnel Costs
While there is no doubt that the direct MADO-related actions heavily influenced the
improvements in this number, as the last step in the process, I maintain that its improvement was
also aided by initiatives taken to speed up and/or improve the steps upstream, something that will
play an even larger role as time passes. On note, however, is that MADO lost four case
screeners due to reassignment. This contributed to the total number of MADO holds leveling off
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and in the rise of the number of cases greater than 30 days. This is something we will need to
monitor.

FIGURE 10: MADO Security Holds Greater Than 30 Days
X.

NEXT STEPS/OTHER THOUGHTS
Over the period of this OAP, the overall OPM/NBIB backlog continued to increase,

growing from 709,000 cases at the conclusion of 2017 to 750,000 in July 2018. The Air Force
piece of that was 79,000. With about 75 percent of the total cases affecting DoD, Congress
included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 to move
DoD’s cases away from OPM/NBIB to its own purview. The President took this one step further
by proposing a move of the entire process from OPM to DoD. DoD plans to carry out the
guidance over a phased three-year plan. At the conclusion of that plan, Defense Security Service
will own the process in its entirety, including NBIB’s personnel. The Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) will remain the executive agent for security clearance policy, requiring DoD
and ODNI to reach agreement on any policy changes DoD wants to pursue.47
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United States, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Public Law 115-91, 115th Congress,
December 12, 2017, 244-250, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ91/PLAW-115publ91.pdf; Lindy Kyzer,
“Security Clearance Processing Times Continue to Creep Upward,” Clearancejobs.com, July 18, 2018,
https://news.clearancejobs.com/2018/07/18/security-clearance-processing-times-continue-to-creep-upward/;
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One such change is a move to a ‘Continuous Evaluation’ system (CE). Once CE is
implemented only those records of personnel that carry certain flags will go through the full
reinvestigation process. All others will process through the CE system, which monitors
databases from government and commercial sources. If a flag is noted, the individual’s file will
be evaluated against a set of guidelines to determine if any further processing will occur.
Ultimately, CE is designed to reduce investigator’s field work by 90 percent.48
Debate exists on whether moving clearance processing to DoD or enacting CE are the
correct steps to address the process. One argument is that the transition from OPM to DoD will
take more time than expected and that it will not be a ‘clean’ change. Essentially, for these
commentators, the clearance process is moving from one large bureaucracy to another. Another
is that the pure emphasis on speed is, in the end, going to put security in jeopardy. The CE
process is, some argue, going to miss a large number of criminal and other negative activity
when fully implemented. Irrespective of these discussions, in the currently foreseen best-case
scenario, getting the backlog to a manageable level is not expected before March 2021.49
Returning specifically to the issue at hand, even with all the improvements we made this
year, the current average case still takes around 282 days from application start to a person being

Scott Maucione, “Air Force working with NBIB, OPM to speed up clearance process,” Federal News Network, April
19, 2018, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/air-force/2018/04/air-force-working-with-nbib-and-opm-to-speedsecurity-clearance-process/; Erich Wagner, “Moving Security Clearance Processing Out of OPM Won’t Fix the
Backlog,” Government Executive, August 7, 2018, https://www.govexec.com/management/2018/08/movingsecurity-clearance-processing-out-opm-wont-fix-backlog/150346/; Lyndy Kyzer, “5 Things We Know About the
Security Clearance Process—And What We Don’t,” Clearancejobs.com, July 2, 2018,
https://news.clearancejobs.com/2018/07/02/5-things-we-know-about-the-security-clearance-process-and-whatwe-dont/; Lyndy Kyzer, “White House Reorganization Moves Security Clearance Background Investigations Under
DoD,” Clearancejobs.com, June 21, 2018, https://news.clearancejobs.com/2018/06/21/white-housereorganization-moves-security-clearance-background-investigations-under-dod/.
48
Of note, CE will apply only to periodic reinvestigations, not to initial investigations, the topic covered in this OAP.
Kyzer, “5 Things We Know About the Security Clearance Process—And What We Don’t”.
49
Wagner, “Moving Security Clearance Processing Out of OPM Won’t Fix the Backlog”; Maucione, “Air Force
working with NBIB, OPM to speed up clearance process”; Kyzer, “Security Clearance Processing Times Continue to
Creep Upward”; Kyzer, “5 Things We Know About the Security Clearance Process—And What We Don’t”.
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able to work at an NSA site or on one of its systems. Although this is far better than the average
for just the OPM/NBIB process under the ‘normal’ scenario, much improvement continues to be
needed.
One final note is that there are two actions that NSA could take to almost eliminate the
822 current cases and prevent a future build up. First, allow airmen to work with a signed
‘consent to polygraph’ form while they await an appointment. Second, allow airmen to work
after an interim security clearance has been granted. This would put them in line with the other
‘three letter’ combat support agencies like the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These are actions we will continue to pursue.
XI.

CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this OAP, 985 airmen were unable to perform their mission due to

security clearance-based delays at NSA sites or at locations with its systems. This is a
significant problem, impacting our operations and, I believe, our retention of talented personnel.
It is also one that impacts not just 25 AF but the entire U.S. government. In all likelihood, many
of the process steps that cause the problems are the unintended consequences of well-intentioned
actions taken in the aftermath of intelligence leaks or data breaches.
Over the course of the project, a number of steps were taken to address this roughly
$95M matter. For example, applications for intelligence-related personnel are now given a
priority label at MEPS and four contract screeners were added to the BMT workforce to help
with the OPM/NBIB & DoD CAF backlogs. Personnel moving to the Republic of Korea now
have a PPC code requiring a current ci-polygraph in order to get movement orders. MADO
agreed to authorize site-to-site transfers and to accept security information packages up to six
months prior to arrival. Additionally, a CWVS contract was awarded and this web-based
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solution for paperwork transfer should be in place by the last quarter of 2019. Many other
initiatives are in progress but these serve as a representative sample. Moreover, partnerships,
like those with AETC A2/9 and the MADO Chief, were key to improving the situation over the
project period.
Figure 11 demonstrates the impact seen to date. Overall, a $15,847,724 (17 percent)
improvement occurred. By the project’s conclusion, the number of airmen unable to access their
work centers dropped from 985 to 822. MADO holds improved by 61 percent, dropping from
449 personnel to 173. Those cases greater than 30 days fell by 46 percent, a major improvement.
Although the OPM/NBIB & DoD CAF numbers indicated a net negative for this period, as I
argue in the main text, I believe that without the actions taken that figure could be as much as
122 cases, or $11.9M, higher. CI-polygraph numbers ended up essentially treading water for the
OAP period. A data reporting issue by one organization wiped out what was going to be an
approximately $3M gain in that category. As a reminder, the impact of all actions taken as a
result of this OAP will not be seen until 2019 and beyond.

CHANGE IN PERSONNEL COST SUMMARY
January
October
Net
OPM/NBIB & DoD CAF $ 43,462,786 $ 53,631,963 $ (10,169,177)
CI-Polygraph
$ 8,768,965 $ 9,645,862 $
(876,897)
MADO Holds
$ 43,752,597 $ 16,858,799 $ 26,893,798
NET SAVINGS

$ 15,847,724
FIGURE 11: Change in Personnel Cost Summary

Besides dealing with a problem as ingrained as this one is to start with, one hindrance to
progress was some data tracking issues by certain of our field units that resulted in the late
addition of about 144 people and, more importantly, in time lost processing the cases. Another
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item that will continue to require attention is educating personnel in recruiting and at MEPS
locations on the importance of timely and accurate processing of security clearance applications.
Technical issues such as the information sharing problem that arose between JPAS and DISS
also require continued focus. That item further serves as a warning to closely monitor for similar
issues when CWVS goes online.
After all the actions taken to date, the areas that continue to require the most attention are
OPM/NBIB’s and DoD CAF’s processes. Essentially, it could be argued that the nature of the
system itself remains flawed. This OAP project was not designed to overhaul the structure of the
security clearance process. It pursued what are in essence “operational improvements” to gain
the most from the current system. What is really needed from future researchers is an approach
more akin to the “operational innovation” described by Michael Hammer where an entirely new
way of doing business alters the security clearance process to achieve breakthrough change.50
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Michael Hammer, “Deep Change: How Operational Innovation Can Transform Your Company,” Harvard Business
Review OnPoint, April 2014 (R0404E), 1-2.
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XIII. APPENDIX A
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XIV. ABSTRACT
NSA Site Access: Twenty-Fifth Air Force’s $95M+ Problem
This Organizational Action Project (OAP) examined and addressed security clearance-based delays for
Twenty-Fifth Air Force (25 AF) airmen at National Security Agency (NSA) sites and other locations with
that organization’s mission systems. The approximate personnel cost associated with this issue was
$95.98M at the beginning of the OAP cycle. Across the enterprise, 985 airmen were unable to perform
their missions due to this problem. Given its significance, the OAP focused on discovering initiatives that
could be pursued at any stage of the security clearance granting process.
Data relevant to the issue was collected from our field units and published weekly to senior leaders in the
organization. Tracked data consisted of open National Background Investigation Bureau priority personnel
security investigations and DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility adjudications, NSA Military Affairs
Division (MADO) security holds, and counter-intelligence polygraph requirements. Using this institutional
data, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 65-503 (US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors) was utilized to apply
costs to define the original state of affairs and determine the impact of improvements.
A representative, though not all-inclusive, list of actions taken includes: 1) Applications for intelligencerelated personnel are now given a priority label at Military Entrance Processing Stations, 2) four contract
clearance screeners were added to the Basic Military Training workforce, 3) a personnel processing code
requiring a current ci-polygraph in order to get movement orders was added to certain assignments, 4)
MADO authorized site-to-site transfers, 5) MADO agreed to accept security information packages six
months prior to arrival, and 6) a Clearance Workforce Verification System contract was awarded to create
a web-based solution to handle transfer paperwork. By the conclusion of the OAP reporting cycle, a $15.8M
(17 percent) improvement occurred. The impact of all actions taken will not be seen until 2019 and beyond.
The findings and results of this project highlight that addressing a significant and potentially daunting multiorganizational problem like security clearance-based delays is not insurmountable. This OAP pursued
operational improvements to gain the most from the current system. The project was not designed to
overhaul the structure of the security clearance process. This author posits that what is really needed from
future researchers is an approach more akin to the operational innovation described by Michael Hammer
where an entirely new way of doing business alters the security clearance process to achieve breakthrough
change.
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